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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of tax incentives on corporate research and
development (R&D) activity. Traditionally, R&D tax incentives have been pro-
vided in the form of special tax allowances and tax credits. In recent years, several
countries moreover reduced their income tax rates on R&D output. Previous pa-
pers have shown that all three tax instruments are effective in raising the quantity
of R&D related activity. We provide evidence that, beyond this quantity effect,
corporate taxation also distorts the quality of R&D projects, i.e. their innova-
tiveness and revenue potential. Using rich data on corporate patent applications
to the European patent office, we find that a low tax rate on patent income
is instrumental in attracting innovative projects with a high earnings potential
and innovation level. The effect is statistically significant and economically rel-
evant and prevails in a number of sensitivity checks. R&D tax credits and tax
allowances are in turn not found to exert a statistically significant impact on
project quality.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, corporate tax policies related to research and development (R&D)
have been high on governments’ agendas in many countries. While, traditionally, tax
incentives to foster R&D investment have been provided in the form of special tax
allowances and tax credits, several countries recently also lowered their tax rates on
patent income, including, among others, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium.
The most recent addition to the list is the United Kingdom, which announced to reduce
its tax rate on patent income from 28% to 10% in April 2013 with the intention ’to
strengthen the incentives to invest in innovative industries and ensure [that] the UK
remains an attractive location for innovation’.1
The welfare implications of these policy reforms are a priori ambiguous. Their success
critically depends on the effect of tax incentives on R&D activities. If the effects are
small, R&D incentives just generate windfall gains to the corporate sector as they
subsidize R&D activities that would have been undertaken anyway. In recent years, a
number of empirical studies have assessed the effect of special tax provisions on the
quantity of R&D activities, commonly reporting significant and sizable effects for both,
R&D tax allowances/credits and patent income tax rates (e.g. Hines and Jaffe, 2001,
Bloom and Griffith, 2001, Griffith et al., 2011, Ernst and Spengel, 2011, Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012). While quantity effects are clearly important, the welfare benefits
related to R&D activity likely also depend on project quality. Gains from technological
spillovers are for example determined by the degree of innovativeness of an R&D project
and corporate income tax payments hinge on the project’s earnings potential (see
Becker and Fuest, 2007, Fuest et al. 2012 for related arguments).
This paper argues that corporate tax incentives may also exert an effect on the
quality of R&D projects. To receive guidance for the empirical analysis, the paper
develops a simple theoretical model of a multinational group that operates affiliates in
different countries and decides about the location of heterogeneous R&D projects. As
R&D income becomes part of the local corporate tax base, the MNE has an incentive
to distort the location of its projects in favor of low-tax affiliates (quantity effect).
This incentive moreover turns out to be larger, the higher the technology’s earnings
potential. Low tax countries thus attract projects with an above average value and
degree of innovativeness compared to high-tax locations (quality effect). Importantly,
a similar quality effect is not derived for R&D tax credits and allowances as their
1See paragraph 4.40 of HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report 2009, December 2009.
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benefits are related to the size of R&D expenditures instead of (expected) earnings.
To test for these hypotheses, we exploit information on the universe of patent appli-
cations to the European Patent Office (EPO) between 1995 and 2007 which is drawn
from the PATSTAT data base. Following previous studies, we exploit information on
the host country of the patent inventor to proxy for the location of corporate R&D
activity. The patent information is moreover linked to rich firm level data that provides
detailed accounting and ownership information on multinational firms in Europe and
allows us to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across patent invent-
ing affiliates. To proxy for the earnings potential and innovativeness of R&D projects,
we furthermore make use of factor analysis to derive a measure for patent quality as
reflected by three indicators: the patent’s number of forward citations, its family size
(i.e. the number of countries in which the corporation filed for patent protection) and
the number of industry classes stated on the patent.
This patent information is merged with detailed data on national R&D tax incentives.
We include information on the effective patent income tax rate, which accounts for taxes
levied on patent income in the royalty receiving country as well as for withholding
taxes levied in the royalty paying country in case of cross-border royalty streams and
the unilateral and bilateral method to avoid double taxation. Moreover, we follow the
existing literature and construct a tax variable (the so-called B-index) that accounts
for tax incentives provided through R&D tax allowances and R&D tax credits.
Our results suggest that patent income taxation exerts a significantly negative effect
on patent quality. Quantitatively, we find that an increase in the patent income tax rate
by 10 percentage points reduces patent quality by around 5.6%. This result prevails
in a large number of specifications and sensitivity checks which control for observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in patent quality across industries, countries and firms.
In line with the theoretical presumption, we do not find a significant impact of cor-
porate tax allowances and tax credits (as measured by the B-index) on patent quality
though. As sketched above, this likely reflects that tax credits and tax allowances are
designed to increase R&D expenditures, i.e. they are targeted to boost the input side of
R&D activities, while patent quality, in turn, is directly related to the output of R&D
investments.2 Thus, while both, special tax allowances/credits and low patent income
tax rates raise the level of R&D activity, our analysis finds that only patent income
tax provisions are instrumental in raising the quality of corporate R&D projects.
2R&D tax allowances and tax credits are not expected to exert an impact as long as the firm’s
pre-tax profits are large enough to ensure that tax allowances and tax credits can be fully exploited.
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The paper contributes to several strands of the economic literature. Firstly, it directly
relates to a small number of papers which assess the impact of R&D tax incentives on
R&D expenditure. For the US, Hall (1993) and Hines (1994) study the responsiveness
of corporate R&D to the Research and Experimentation Tax Credit and find signifi-
cant R&D price elasticities. Similarly, Jaffe and Hines (2001) determine how US R&D
expense deduction rules affect the location of R&D by US multinationals. Bloom et
al. (2002) confirm a significantly positive effect of R&D tax credits on the level of
R&D expenditures using macro data for major OECD countries (see also Hall and van
Reenen (2000) and Arundel et al. (2008) for survey papers on the topic).3
Griffith et al. (2011), Ernst and Spengel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012)
moreover find a negative effect of patent income taxes on the number of corporate
patent applications. As the authors focus on the location of the patent applicant (who
is presumed to be the owner of the associated royalty income) and do not distinguish
between patents where applicant and inventor are located in the same and different
countries respectively, the findings may reflect both, responses in the quantity of cor-
porate R&D activity to patent income taxation as well as the strategic location of
mobile patent income in low-tax countries, e.g. through patent holding entities that
are geographically separated from R&D locations. Boehm et al. (2012) find that geo-
graphical splits of patent applicant and inventor are in general rare events which are
partly motivated by tax considerations though.4 To avoid results that reflect multina-
tional income shifting through geographical relocations of patents from R&D units, our
analysis focuses on the location of the patent inventor and disregards patents where
applicant and inventor are located in different countries.
Our paper adds to the sketched literature by stressing that tax provisions for patent
income may not only impact on the quantity of R&D and patent holdings but also on
their quality. In this sense, the paper is related to recent contributions that emphasize
the importance of quality aspects in assessing the welfare consequences of corporate
3In a recent paper, Ernst and Spengel (2011) report a faint impact of R&D tax incentives on the
number of corporate patent applications. Buettner and Wamser (2009) find positive effects of R&D
tax incentives on the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) of German multinationals.
4Corporations may implement a geographical split between the location of R&D activities and
patent income through advantageous cost sharing agreements or contract research schemes, where an
R&D unit undertakes research for a group affiliate in a tax-haven country which finances the project
and bears its risk. With contract research, the R&D unit earns a small fixed profit margin on its
costs, while the residual income accrues with the contracting entity in the low-tax country. Mutti
and Grubert (2008) present indirect evidence that US companies engage in advantageous cost sharing
schemes in order to relocate royalty revenues to foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
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taxation. Becker and Fuest (2007) and Fuest et al. (2012) criticize that conventional
studies solely focus on the effect of corporate taxes on the quantity of capital invest-
ment. The welfare effects of the investment, however, critically depend on the number
of jobs created, the associated profit and tax revenue base, and the project’s innovative-
ness. Our results confirm their argumentation as we find a negative effect of corporate
taxation on patent quality, which is presumed to go along with lower patent income
(i.e. a lower tax revenue base) and lower innovativeness.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present a simple
theoretical model to motivate our empirical analysis. Sections 3 and 4 describe our
data set and estimation methodology. The results are presented in Section 5. Section
6 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Model
The following section presents a short theoretical model to motivate our empirical
analysis. Consider a representative company which engages in R&D activities and may
locate R&D projects in a country h or a country `. The project success is risky and the
company has to form expectations on the pre-tax earnings pii of each project i. The
expected value is denoted by E(pii).
Moreover, all R&D projects incur costs of C which are assumed to accrue at the
beginning of the period and are therefore deterministic.5 Both countries levy a tax rate
on the return of the innovative project [E(pii) − C] denoted by tk with k ∈ {h, `}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country h imposes a higher corporate tax
rate than country `, i.e. th > t`.
Both countries are, moreover, assumed to provide an R&D tax credit which reduces
the company’s tax burden by τk cents for each Dollar invested in R&D (k ∈ {h, `}).
If the company’s profits exceed τk · C, the R&D tax credit reduces the corporate tax
burden by the full amount of the credit τk ·C. If the tax due is smaller than the value of
the corporate tax credit, the actual tax reduction granted by the tax credit is smaller
than τk ·C as tax authorities commonly do not pay out subsidies to loss-making firms.6
5Note that this assumption is not decisive for our results though.
6We abstract from loss offset opportunities where losses in one period may be consolidated with
profits in later periods or profits of other firms that belong to the same corporate group. We also
abstract from refund options for R&D tax credits that are granted in some countries like the United
Kingdom, France and Austria. This is a reasonable simplification as the refund is often delayed or
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Formally, the full tax credit is exploited if
tk[pii − C] ≥ τkC, ⇐⇒ pii
C
≥ τk
tk
+ 1 (1)
Thus, the firm’s corporate tax payment is reduced by the full amount τk ·C if the profit
(or earnings) to costs ratio pii/C of the project is large and the tax credit rate τk is
small relative to the patent income tax tk.
Moreover, we assume that the project’s after-tax profit is affected by a set of factors
which are not explicitly modeled and which are subsumed in the variable µik with k ∈
{`, h}.7 Factors that may determine an affiliate’s suitability to host and run project i
are, for example, the availability of high-skilled human capital or the access to technical
equipment in the host country. The project’s after-tax profit reads
Πik = (1− tk) [E(pii)− C] + γikτkC + µik, k ∈ {`, h} (2)
where γik = γik(E(pii), tk, τk) takes on the value 1 if the expected earnings are above a
critical threshold value E˜(pii) which allows for full exploitation of the R&D tax credit,
with E˜(pii)
C
= τk
tk
+ 1. Otherwise, if E(pii) < E˜(pii), it holds that 0 < γik < 1, with
∂γik/∂E(pii) > 0. Put differently, if expected corporate earnings fall below the critical
threshold upon which corporate tax payments are larger than the value of the R&D tax
credit, the tax credit cannot be fully exploited and the value of the credit increases in
the expected corporate earnings. With [E(pii)− C] = 0, it holds that γik = γikτkC = 0.
The firm is assumed to maximize its after-tax profit and will thus locate the R&D
project i in jurisdiction ` if
φ = Πi` − Πih = (th − t`)[E(pii)− C] + (γi`τ` − γihτh)C + (µi` − µih) > 0 (3)
Consequently, the attractiveness of location ` relative to location h increases in the
tax rate differential th − t`. Thus, the smaller the corporate tax burden of location `
relative to location h, the more attractive it is for the firm to locate the project in
country `. Formally, this reads
∂φ
∂(th − t`) = E(pii)− C (4)
Intuitively, the importance of the tax rate differential for the firm’s location choice
increases in the value of the expected earnings as higher expected earnings result in
subject to a significant discount from the original tax credit’s value.
7For simplicity reasons, we abstract from any tax-consequences of µik. It may be considered to re-
flect additional or reduced volumes of equity finance and, hence, non-tax-deductible capital investment
costs necessary for the project.
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a larger corporate tax base and imply that differences in corporate tax rates exert a
stronger influence on corporate tax payments. Formally,
∂2φ
∂(th − t`)∂E(pii) = 1 > 0 (5)
Thus, the incentive of the firm to locate project i in low-tax country ` becomes larger
the higher the expected earnings of the project. This induces a project selection across
locations in the sense that projects with high (low) earnings tend to be located in the
low-tax country ` (high-tax country h).
Analogous considerations apply for the tax credit rate τ . If tax payments before the
tax credit tk[E(pii) − C] are large enough to exploit the full tax credit, it holds that
γi` = γih = 1. Differences in the tax credit rates τk then affect the location choice as
∂φ
∂(τh − τ`) = −C (6)
Thus, the larger the difference in the tax credit rate granted by country h and country
`, the lower is the probability that the project is located in country `. Note that this
effect is independent from the expected earnings of the project as the value of the tax
credit is determined by the size of R&D spending only (∂2φ/∂(τh − τ`)∂E(pii) = 0).
The latter result does not hold though if affiliate earnings fall short from the tax credit
value τ ·C and γik = γik(E(pii)) < 1. Then, the effect of a change in the tax credit rate
in country h on the probability that the project is located in country ` reads
∂φ
∂τh
= −C · γih (7)
Increases in the earnings rate of the project now diminish the probability that the
project is located in country ` as higher earnings now imply that a larger fraction of
the increased tax credit in country h can be exploited. Formally,
∂2φ
∂τh∂E(pii)
= −C · ∂γih
∂E(pii)
< 0 (8)
Summarizing, the considerations in this section suggest that the corporate incentive
to locate R&D projects in countries with a small patent income tax rate increases in
the expected earnings and profitability of the projects. In the contrary, high tax credit
rates do not impact on the earnings potential of the attracted projects if project profits
(and other affiliate earnings) are high enough to ensure that the firm can exploit the
full amount of the tax credit. High tax credit rates are only instrumental in attracting
projects with above average earnings in situations in which the earnings rate of the
project and other affiliate taxable activities are too low to exploit the full amount of
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the tax credit. Consequently, we expect that countries with a low patent income tax
rate attract R&D projects with above average returns, while the effect is less clear
for countries which grant high tax credits on R&D expenditures. In the following, we
will empirically assess these hypotheses using patent data from the European Patent
Office’s (EPO) Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT).
3 Data
Patent and Firm Data
The PATSTAT data contains information on all patent applications to the EPO, in-
cluding information about the patent applicant and patent inventor, the technology of
the patent and patent citations. The information is available for 1978 to 2007. The data
comprises up to 60,000 patent applications per year filed by corporations in Europe.
In the analysis, we will account for patent applications from 1995 onwards as our tax
and firm accounting data is restricted to that period (see below).
Firms seeking patent protection in a number of European states may file an appli-
cation directly at the EPO and designate the relevant national offices (among those
covered by the EPO) in which protection is sought.8 Filing a patent with the EPO
firstly enables a firm to make a single application, which is cheaper than filing sepa-
rately in each national office, and, secondly, allows the firm to delay the decision over
which national states to further the application in. Thus, it is especially attractive to
file the valuable patents, which a firm intends to exploit in several European markets
with the EPO.
Following previous studies, we use information on the location of the patent inventor
as a proxy for R&D activity. Note that in most cases (more than 90% of the patent
applications), the patent inventor is also the applicant of the patent and thus the owner
of the associated income stream (or, patent inventor and applicant are at least located
in the same country). As recent papers suggest that the decision to geographically split
the location of patent inventor and patent applicant may partly reflect tax-motivated
international profit shifting (see e.g. Boehm et al., 2012), we drop the according patents
from our analysis and thus focus on the ’standard’ case where the patent inventing unit
8The EPO is not a body of the European Union and, as a result, the states which form part of the
European Patent Convention (the legal basis for the EPO) are distinct from those in the European
Union. See: http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html.
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is also the patent owner or is at least located in the same country.9
Furthermore, we link the patent information to firm-level accounting and ownership
data in the AMADEUS data base provided by Bureau van Dijk. The link between
the data bases is achieved through standard name matching procedures. Following
previous efforts (see e.g. Abramovsky et al., 2008), the name of the AMADEUS firm
has been matched to the name of the applicant on the patent application. Success rates
of that procedure are comparable to previous studies (see e.g. Thoma et al., 2010). On
average around 67% of the patents in our data are matched over all sample years and
countries.10 The match rates for the five largest EU countries by population are, for
example, 47% for Spain, 55% for France, 68% for Germany, 63% for Italy and 72% for
the United Kingdom. The majority of patent applicants is located in large industrialized
economies. In the following, we will restrict our sample to corporate patents filed by
multinational firms in Europe. Table 1a presents host country statistics for the patent
applications in our data.11
Construction of the Patent Quality Indicators
As described above, the purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of corporate taxation
on the earnings potential and other quality aspects of R&D projects in a country. Patent
applications are ideal for this purpose as they allow to construct information on the
underlying value of the patent and, hence, the invented technology to the firm. This is
especially important as it has been demonstrated by earlier research that the corporate
value of patents strongly varies and exhibits a highly skewed value distribution (see
e.g. Harhoff et al., 1999).
In the following, project quality is proxied by the quality of patents invented in a
country (see Section 5 for a discussion of this approach). The patent quality measure
used in this analysis is constructed on the basis of a factor analysis.12 The factor model
accounts for three separate indicators (forward citations, family size and the number
of technical fields) of the patent’s underlying, latent quality.13 The estimates of the
9Note that the patent applicant is the legal owner of the technology at the time of the application
(as only the legal owner may apply for patent protection) and is therefore also the relevant subject
for taxation (e.g. Quick and Day, 2006; Ernst and Spengel, 2011).
10For more details on the matching procedure, see Ernst and Spengel (2011).
11Note that our data is restricted to granted patents which allow for the construction of patent
quality indicators as sketched in the next section.
12See Hall et al. (2007). We are grateful to Grid Thoma for providing us with this data.
13Each indicator’s variation is assumed to consist of a quality related and an idiosyncratic com-
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factor model can be used to construct an estimator for patent quality conditional on
the indicators. In the following, we will give a brief description of the information used
to derive the quality index. See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) and Hall et al. (2007)
for more details.
The first quality information used for the index construction is the patent’s family
size, i.e. the number of jurisdictions or countries in which the firm has filed for patent
protection for a particular innovation. We consider family size to be a particularly good
proxy for our purpose as the theoretical model predicts that corporate income taxation
induces a systematic selection of R&D projects with different expected earnings po-
tentials across countries. While expected earnings of an R&D project are unobservable
to the researcher, the patent’s family size may serve as a good proxy since filing for
patent protection involves considerable costs (see e.g. Helfgott, 1993). Thus, it only
pays for a firm to protect its innovation in many markets if the innovation’s expected
earnings potential is large. For the construction of the measure, note that PATSTAT
also contains information on patent applications to the US patent office and all other
major national patent offices. This information is used to identify equivalent applica-
tions filed outside of the EPO at an earlier time (priority applications). In a first step,
all priorities for the EPO patents were identified. In a second step, all applications that
report the EPO application as a priority were identified. After removing any double
counting, the number of patent applications plus the patents from step 1 constitute
the size of the patent family.
Additionally, the patent quality measure accounts for the number of forward citations
received by a patent within the 5 year period from the publication date. Intuitively, a
high number of forward citations indicates that the technology protected by the patent
has served as a basis for several future inventions and thus indicates a high degree
of innovativeness and, as innovativeness determines economic success, a high earnings
potential. Forward citations have an important legal function in the sense that they
limit the scope of property rights which are awarded to a patent. In the case of EPO
patents, inventors are not required to cite prior technology used in the development of
their patent but the references are added by patent examiners. On the one hand, this
implies that not necessarily all innovations which draw on an existing patent in fact
acknowledge the reference. On the other hand, an external patent examiner has the
benefit of following a consistent and objective patent citation practice.14
ponent. Estimation of the factor model exploits that variation in patent quality induces variation
common to all indicators.
14Note that previous studies have also used backward citations as a measure for patent quality.
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Last, the construction of the patent quality index accounts for the number of techno-
logical classes named on the patent which have been shown by previous research to be
an indicator of technological quality (see Lerner, 1994). For the purpose of guarantee-
ing a reasonable level of precision, the construction of our quality measures accounts
for an eight-digit IPC classification reported in the patent document.
In general, several authors have also stressed that the value of patents varies across
industries and across time. To account for that, we follow previous studies (e.g. Hall et
al., 2007) and use quality measures which control for technology and year fixed effects
(i.e. determine deviations from the average patent quality in a technology class at a
given point in time). Note that using quality measures which do not account for this
type of normalization yields similar results to the ones reported in this paper, as our
regressions account for year and technology fixed effects.
Descriptive statistics for the quality measures in our data are presented in Table
1b. The composite quality index accounts for all three quality dimensions (forward
citations, family size and industry classes) and controls for technology and year fixed
effects. The average index is approximately 0, varying strongly between −2.5 and +7.3
though. Quality indices which account for one of the quality dimensions only (forward
citations and family size) exhibit a similar distribution.
Corporate Taxation
As described above, our analysis will assess the effect of the corporate tax system on
patent applications, accounting for two types of tax incentive instruments: the (output-
based) patent income tax rate and (input-based) tax credit and allowances measures.
Information on the patent income tax in the host country of the patent inventor is
obtained from Ernst and Young’s corporate tax guides, the International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation’s country analyses and other sources. Most countries tax patent
income at the same rate as other corporate income. In recent years, a growing number
of countries have, however, introduced special low tax rates on patent income (e.g. Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). While many of these special provisions were
introduced after 2007 and are, thus, not reflected in our data, our tax measure accounts
While some scholars have suggested that a large number of backward citations may, for example,
reflect a more derivative nature of a patent and a lower degree of innovation (see e.g. Lanjouw and
Schankerman, 2004), a large number of citations may also reflect an innovative combination of existing
ideas. Consequently, the literature has provided mixed results regarding the correlation between back-
ward citations and patent value (see e.g. Harhoff et al. 1999). Hence, following this argumentation,
our patent quality indicators do not account for information on backward citations.
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for special tax provisions where applicable (in France, Ireland and the Netherlands).
The average tax rate applicable to the patents in our data is 41%, varying strongly
between 10% and 59%. The high average rate reflects that many patents in our data
are filed from large economies, like Germany, which also charged high tax rates on
corporate income within our sample period.
Yet, using this statutory tax rate as a measure for the tax burden on patent income
disregards that several countries additionally levy a so-called withholding tax on royalty
payments from their border. In case of cross-border royalty streams, patent income is,
thus, not only taxed in the country that receives the royalty income but may also be
taxed in the royalty paying country. Royalty tax rates are commonly determined in
bilateral double taxation agreements between countries. The according information is
retrieved from recent and historic bilateral tax treaties and from Ernst and Young’s
corporate tax guides. To avoid double taxation, royalty receiving countries commonly
grant a tax credit for withholding taxes paid on the royalty income.15 Thus, the effective
tax rate te on a cross-border royalty stream is the maximum of the royalty income tax
rate tk in the patentee’s host country k and the royalty withholding rate twjk charged
on royalty streams from country j to country k: te = max(tk, twjk).
To determine the average tax on royalty income related to a particular patent, we
have to make assumptions on the structure of the royalty streams. We pursue two
strategies: Firstly, we assume that the patent owner receives royalty payments from
all countries within EU25 for the patented technology whereas the relative size of
the royalty streams corresponds to the country size distribution as measured by the
country’s relative GDP. This assumption reflects that production and sales activities
are plausibly positively correlated with market size and, thus, trigger higher payments
for the use of the protected innovation. Formally, the definition reads
te =
25∑
j=1
Wj ·max(tk, twjk) (9)
where j indicates the considered country within EU25, including the host country of the
patentee, and twjk depicts the respective royalty withholding rate charged on royalty
income paid from country j to the patentee’s host country k.16 Wj is a weighting
matrix capturing the size of the country’s GDP relative to all other EU 25 countries
15There were a few exceptions to the credit method. If no double tax treaty was in force for a specific
country in a specific year (especially in the 1990ies) the unilateral method to avoid double taxation
was applied to calculate the effective income tax rate, e.g. deduction of the foreign withholding tax.
16Note that twjk = 0 if j = k.
12
(Wj = GDPj/
∑25
j=1GDPj).
An alternative way to construct the effective tax measure is to exploit information on
the structure of multinational corporations in our data. Precisely, innovation protected
by corporate patents is often exploited within the boundaries of the multinational firm
only to avoid knowledge dissipation to competitors (Zuniqa and Guellec, 2009). Thus,
our second strategy assumes that royalties are paid to the patentee from all other firms
belonging to the multinational group. Ideally, following the above logic, one might want
to weigh the information by affiliate size. As size information is missing for a relatively
large number of cases in the AMADEUS data base though17, we follow previous studies
(see e.g. Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) and construct an unweighted average, which takes
on the form
te =
∑
j
1
J
·max(tk, twjk) (10)
where j indicates each of the J other affiliates within the multinational group (apart
from the patenting affiliate), including the parent firm, and twjk again denotes the
withholding tax rate charged by their host country on royalty payments to the patentee.
Moreover, to measure the effects of R&D tax credits and allowances on the quality of
patents, we follow Warda (2001) and construct the so-called B-index which captures the
tax component in the costs of an R&D investment (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (2003)), accounting for special tax incentive regimes. The measure formally
reads
Bk =
1− Zk · tk
1− tk (11)
where tk stands for the corporate income tax rate in country k and Zk represents a
measure for the deductibility of R&D expenditures, including tax allowances or tax
credits granted for R&D investments. The numerator reflects the after-tax cost of one
unit of expenditure in R&D. If an R&D investment can be fully expensed in a fiscal year,
the B-Index is equal to one since Zk equals one. A tax incentive, granting for example
an additional deduction on top of the normal deduction of R&D expenditures, reduces
the value of Bk below one, as Zk is then larger than one. Consequently, the lower the
B-Index the more attractive is the tax system for R&D investments and vice versa.
The B-Index information was obtained from Ernst and Spengel (2011).
17Note that AMADEUS contains ownership information on a worldwide basis. For most subsidiaries
and parents outside Europe, accounting information which allows to proxy for subsidiary size is not
available though.
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Control Variables
Last, we augment our data by information on other country characteristics, like GDP
per capita (as a proxy for economic development), the size of population (as a proxy
for country size) and a corruption perception index obtained from the World Develop-
ment Indicator Database and Transparency International respectively. We furthermore
include information on the concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic author-
ity in a country’s governing institutions using the so-called Polity2 Index. Note that
Transparency International’s corruption perception index ranges from 0 (high corrup-
tion) to 10 (absence of corruption), while the Polity 2 Index varies from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic).
4 Estimation Strategy
As described above, the aim of our analysis is to identify whether the structure of the
corporate tax system affects the quality of R&D projects undertaken in a country. To
do so, we proxy for project quality by the patent quality indicators described in the
previous section and estimate a model of the following form
qiat = β0 + β1τit + β2Xiat + φa + µt + iat (12)
where qiat indicates the quality of patent i filed at time t by affiliate a. The explana-
tory variable of main interest is τit, which is the vector of corporate tax parameters
comprising the statutory tax rate on patent income levied by the host jurisdiction of
the patenting firm, the effective tax rate on patent income and the B-Index capturing
any tax incentive regimes for R&D investment. The theoretical considerations laid out
above suggest that firms strategically select R&D projects across countries in the sense
that patent quality is higher the smaller the statutory and effective tax rate on patent
income, implying that we expect a negative coefficient estimate for the respective tax
variables. The effect of the B-index on patent quality is less clear though. While, for
low-profit firms, it may be attractive to locate high-value projects in countries with
generous R&D tax allowances and tax credits to ensure that the reported earnings are
high enough to exploit the full deduction value of the R&D tax incentives, this does
not hold true for the standard case of firms which generate enough taxable earnings to
account for the full R&D related tax deductions. For them, the deduction value of the
R&D tax allowances and tax credits is independent from project quality and earnings
and hence, we presume a zero effect for these entities.
To control for time-constant heterogeneity in average patent quality across firms
14
and industries, we moreover include a full set of affiliate fixed effects and industry fixed
effects (as determined by the first industry class named on the patent) in the estimation.
The set of regressors is furthermore augmented by a full set of year fixed effects to
absorb common shocks to patent quality which simultaneously affect all patents in
the data. Additionally, we include time-varying country controls for market size (as
measured by the host country’s GDP), the degree of development (as measured by the
host country’s GDP per capita) and the country’s political and governance situation (as
measured by the Transparency International corruption index and the Polity2 Index).
Last, we augment the vector of control variables by firm size information as measured
by the number of employees to control for a potential systematic correlation between
corporate taxation, firm size and patent quality.
5 Results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 2 to 5. The tables display the coefficient
estimates and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which are adjusted for cluster-
ing at the country-year level. In Specification (1) of Table 2, we regress the composite
quality measure on the statutory tax rate levied on patent income in the host country
of the patent applicant, simultaneously controlling for country and year fixed effects.
The coefficient estimate is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an in-
crease in the patent income tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the quality index
by 0.025. Evaluated at the sample mean, this corresponds to a decline by 1.1%.18
Specifications (2) and (3) reestimate specification (1) augmenting the vector of re-
gressors by a full set of industry fixed effects and time-varying country controls. While
the inclusion of the additional control variables leaves the qualitative results unaffected,
adding the set of time-varying country controls leads to a slight drop in the quantitative
coefficient estimate for the statutory tax rate variable. Specification (4), furthermore,
includes a full set of affiliate fixed effects which absorb any time-constant heterogeneity
in the quality of R&D projects across patent inventing firms. Specification (5) adds the
logarithm of the firm’s number of employees as an additional control variable. Both
specifications confirm our previous findings and suggest a significantly negative impact
of the patent income tax rate on patent quality. Quantitatively, specification (5) in-
18As the composite quality index (CQI) may take on negative values, the semi-elasticity is evaluated
at the sample average of the variable plus the absolute value of the variable’s minimum: |min(CQI)|+
avg(CQI) = 2.5289− 0.1958 = 2.3331, cf. Table 1b. It follows that 0.025/2.3331 = 1.1%.
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dicates that an increase in the statutory tax rate on patent income by 10 percentage
points decreases the patent quality index by 0.13. Evaluated at the sample mean, this
corresponds to a decline by 5.6%.
As a robustness check, we further reran the analysis using the patent’s number of
forward citations and family size as proxies for its degree of innovation and earnings
potential. The results are presented in specifications (6) to (9). Similar to the previous
estimates, we find that patent taxation reduces the quality measure. An increase in
the tax rate by 10 percentage points lowers the family size index (the forward citation
index) by 0.11 (0.06). Evaluated at the sample mean, this corresponds to a decrease
by 6.4% (2.9%) (cf. specification (7) and specification (9) respectively). To the extent
that the patent’s family size and forward citations serve as a proxy for the earnings
potential and the degree of innovation of the underlying R&D project, the estimates
thus suggest a significant reduction in the two welfare components.
Moreover, the effective tax burden on patent income does not only depend on the
statutory tax on patent income charged by the host country of the royalty recipient but
may, in case of cross-border payments, be equally determined by royalty withholding
taxes charged by the royalty paying country. As laid out in Section 3, we account for
this by constructing an effective tax rate on patent income which takes both rates
into account. The results are presented in Table 3. Specifications (1) to (6) employ
an effective tax rate measure which is constructed based on the assumption that the
patentee receives royalty payments from all countries within EU25 and that the relative
size of the royalty streams matches partner country size (see Section 3, equation (9)).
Specifications (7) to (12) employ an effective tax rate measure which is constructed
based on the assumption that the patentee receives royalties from all other affiliates
within the same multinational group (see Section 3, equation (10)). The results confirm
our qualitative and quantitative baseline findings for the statutory patent income tax
rate, irrespective of whether the composite patent quality index is used as the dependent
variable or the indices reflecting forward citations or patent family size.
Note, moreover, that our results are robust to clustering standard errors at different
levels. While our baseline specifications report standard errors that allow for correlation
of residuals in the same country and year cell, we reran our specifications calculating
standard errors that account for correlation within country clusters and industry clus-
ters respectively. Table 4 presents the results of specifications which reestimate the
models presented in columns (7) to (12) of Table 3. The modification leaves the sta-
tistical significance of the coefficient estimates for the tax variable (the effective tax
measure calculated based on multinational group structure information) unaltered.
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Finally, Table 5 tests for a potential link between R&D tax allowances and tax cred-
its as measured by the B-index and patent quality. Specifications (1) and (2) regress
the composite patent quality index on the B-index as well as the effective tax measure
calculated based on group structure information. The coefficient estimate for the effec-
tive tax rate on patent income, again, shows a negative sign, indicating a statistically
significant and economically relevant impact of patent income taxes on patent qual-
ity. Quantitatively, an increase in the tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces patent
quality by 0.18 or 7.7%. The coefficient estimate for the B-index is in turn quantita-
tively small and statistically insignificant, confirming the notion laid out in Section 2
that R&D tax provisions do not impact on the quality and earnings potential of R&D
projects undertaken in a country as their tax saving value is only related to R&D costs
but not to expected earnings. Again, we reran the regressions using the patent’s for-
ward citations (cf. specifications (3) and (4)) and its family size (cf. specifications (5)
and (6)) as proxies for patent quality which yields comparable results. As a robustness
check, we furthermore also ran specifications which included the B-index as the only
tax measure, which does not change our results.
To sum up, our findings are in line with the notion that firms strategically select their
R&D projects across borders in response to corporate tax incentives. Proxying for the
projects’ earnings potential and degree of innovation by patent quality indicators, we
find that high-value projects tend to be located in countries with a low effective patent
income tax rate, while low-value projects tend to be located in high-tax countries. In
line with our theoretical considerations, we find no statistically significant impact of
R&D tax incentives, like tax allowances and tax credits, on project quality.
Note again that these findings are unlikely to reflect tax-motivated international
profit shifting as we focus on the location of the patent inventing unit and drop patents
where the patent applicant (i.e. the owner) and the patent inventor are located in
different countries. Another issue that merits discussion is the use of the patent quality
measure to proxy for the quality of R&D projects. In particular, strategic patenting
may involve that different subparts of one innovation are protected by a number of
interconnected patents. This directly implies that increases in the quality of an R&D
project may partly show up through increases in the number of patents filed by a
corporation. Using the number of patent applications as the main regressand, like done
in previous research (see e.g. Ernst and Spengel, 2011, Griffith et al., 2011, Karkinsky
and Riedel, 2012), might thus capture both, responses in the quality and quantity
of R&D projects to corporate taxation. The merit of our approach is in turn that it
allows for an isolated identification of the quality effect by investigating the impact of
17
patent income taxation and R&D tax incentives on the quality of patents filed by a
corporation, conditional on the number of patent applications.
6 Conclusion
In recent years, a large and growing empirical literature has shown that corporate tax-
ation negatively impacts on corporate investment behavior at the extensive and inten-
sive margin. Most existing papers, however, restrict their view on testing for corporate
tax effects on investment quantity. The welfare implications of corporate taxation in
turn critically depend on the effects of corporate taxation on investment quality, e.g.
the number of jobs created, the size of corporate tax payments and the innovations
resulting from R&D activity (see Fuest et al., 2012).
The aim of this paper was to assess the effect of the design of the corporate tax
system on the quality of innovations resulting from R&D activity. While a number
of existing papers assess the effect of corporate taxation on quantitative R&D levels
as measured by R&D spending and the number of corporate patent applications, our
analysis stresses that tax instruments may also exert an effect on the quality of R&D
activities, i.e. on their earnings potential (and consequently the company’s corporate
tax payments) and degree of innovation. The paper sets up a simple theoretical model
to derive empirically testable hypotheses. The main insight from the theoretical analysis
is that while low income tax rates on the output from R&D activities raise the quality
of attracted R&D projects, the same does not hold true for R&D tax incentives, like tax
allowances and tax credits, whose benefits for the corporation are related to the size of
its R&D expenditures instead of expected earnings (at least as long as corporate profits
are high enough to fully exploit the tax deduction value related to the incentives).
To assess this hypothesis, we use rich data on patent applications to the EPO between
1995 and 2007 which is linked with firm level information. Proxying for a project’s
earnings potential and innovativeness by patent quality measures constructed from
information on the patent’s family size, its number of forward citations and the number
of industry classes, we find that, in line with our theoretical expectations, low tax rates
on patent income tend to increase the quality of patents filed from a country. The
effect also turns out to be economically relevant. An increase in the patent income tax
rate by 10 percentage points reduces patent quality by around 5.6%. The empirical
findings furthermore confirm the theoretical notion that tax allowances and tax credits
for R&D investment do not exert a significant impact on observed project quality.
18
These results may have important implications for the design of tax instruments re-
lated to innovation policy. In recent years, several governments in Europe significanlty
reduced their tax rates on patent income. Most academic observers interpreted these
policy adjustments to target mobile international patent income. Policy makers in turn
justified the tax adjustment with the aim to foster and attract innovative R&D activ-
ities (see e.g. the UK Pre-Budget Report 2009, footnote 1). Our findings confirm the
latter notion and suggest that low patent income tax rates are indeed instrumental in
attracting R&D projects with an above average earnings potential and innovativeness.
Interestingly, we do not find an analogous effect for R&D tax subsidies, like R&D tax
allowances and R&D tax credits as their deduction value is unrelated to project qual-
ity. Thus, while both tax policy measures may help to attract and increase the size of
R&D projects (i.e. R&D quantity), only low patent income taxes are found to exert a
positive effect on project quality, i.e. its earnings potential and innovativeness.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1a: Country Statistics
Country Number of Patents
Austria 3,127
Belgium 2,217
Bulgaria 9
Switzerland 8,495
Czech Republic 75
Germany 74,620
Denmark 2,536
Spain 1,453
Finland 3,788
France 23,842
Great Britain 12,145
Greece 60
Hungary 166
Ireland 331
Italy 11,886
Lithuania 1
Netherlands 8,080
Norway 969
Poland 53
Portugal 70
Romania 2
Sweden 6,805
Slovenia 50
Slovakia 10
Sum 160,790
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Composite Quality Index 160,790 -.1958 -.2494 -2.5289 7.2887
Quality Index - Forward Citations 160,790 -.2769 -.3026 -2.3566 7.2058
Quality Index - Family Size 160,790 -.0801 -.1349 -1.7970 5.2683
Patent Income Tax 160,790 .4061 .3836 .1 .59
Effective Patent Income Tax (GDP weighted) 159,821 .4057 .3890 .1011 .5680
Effective Patent Income Tax (group structure) 86,284 .4065 .3890 .1 .5680
B-Index 112,058 .9944 .0724 .428 1.069
GDP 160,790 1.55e+12 1.80e+12 1.27e+10 2.90e+12
GDP pC 160,790 26,128.32 25,913.16 5,365.83 51,862.42
Polity2 160,790 9.8513 10 8 10
TPI Corruption Index 160,790 7.6987 7.9 2.9 10
Log Employees 23,056 6.8880 6.8690 0 12.6863
Notes:
The Composite Quality Index is a measure for patent quality derived from a factor model accounting for the patent’s
forward citations, its family size and the number of industry classes (conditional on industry and year fixed effects).
The Forward Citations (Family Size) Index is an analogous measure which accounts for the number of forward citations
(family size) of the patent only. Patent Income Tax stands for the statutory tax rate on patent income, the Effective
Patent Income Tax (GDP weighted) additionally accounts for withholding tax rates on cross-border royalty streams
charged by the royalty paying country. Its construction assumes that the patent owner receives royalties from all
EU25 countries and that the composition of the royalty stream corresponds to the relative size of the countries. The
construction of the Effective Patent Income Tax (group structure) exploits ownership information from the Amadeus
database to identify multinational affiliates within the same multinational group and assumes that the patent owner
receives royalty payments from all other group affiliates (unweighted average). See Section 3 for details. The construction
of the B-index follows Equation (11) in Section 3. GDP and GDP pC depict the host country’s gross domestic product
and gross domestic product per capita respectively in US dollars. The polity2 index captures information on concomitant
qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. The Polity 2 Index varies from -10 (strongly
autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic). TPI Corruption Index stands for the Transparency International corruption
perception index which ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (absence of corruption). Log Employees stands for the
natural logarithm of the number of workers employeed by the patent-filing firm.
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Table 5: B-Index and Patent Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comp. Qual. Index Family Size Forward Citation
Effective Patent Income Tax −.390∗∗∗ -1.819∗∗∗ -.291∗∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗ -.445∗∗∗ -1.266∗∗∗
(.126) (.426) (.084) (.354) (.171) (.399)
B-Index .014 .189 .143 .309 -.016 -.032
(.191) (.304) (.138) (.274) (.244) (453)
GDP/1012 .089∗∗ .144∗∗ .054∗ .167∗∗ .081 -.021
(.040) (.068) (.029) (.053) (.058) (.099)
GDP pC/103 -.023∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ -.010∗ .036∗∗ -.037∗∗∗ .023
(.008) (.015) (.006) (.013) (.009) (.020)
Polity2 .076 .034 .148∗∗∗ .075 -.260∗ -.136
(.051) (.086) (.045) (.069) (157) (.143)
TPI Corruption Index .058∗∗∗ .065∗∗ .039∗∗ .046∗ .061∗∗ .056
(.019) (.030) (.014) (.024) (.027) (.038)
Log Employees .015 .011 .027
(.022) (.016) (031)
Industry Fixed Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Country Fixed Effects
√ √ √
Affiliate Fixed Effects
√ √ √
# Observations 59,197 15,083 59,197 15,083 59,197 15,083
R Squared 0.1306 0.4912 0.1844 0.5977 0.0531 0.3415
Notes:
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for
country-year clusters in parentheses. The observational unit is the patent application whereas the sample is restricted
to patent applications where inventor and patent applicant are located in the same country. The dependent variable
is the composite patent quality index (specifications (1)-(2)) and the family size (specifications (3)-(4)) and forward
citations index respectively (specifications (5)-(6)). For details on the variable definition, see the notes to Table 1b. All
specifications include a full set of year fixed effects.
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